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1. THE BROAD BACKGROUND : CYCLES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Most observers of South Africa as well as many thinking South 
Africans have a broad notion that the inequality between black 
and white in the society and poor conditions in black communities 
make South Africa vulnerable to massive instability. There have 
been frequent predictions of pending revolution, or at least of 
instability, and these warnings continue.
One of the better-known writers on South Africa in the U S A ,  Karis,
for example, has very recently argued that a steady intensification
of racial violence in South Africa is taking place: "The longer
the struggle takes, the more will violence spread and become bloodier
on both sides...white black polarisaiton is almost bound to become
more bitter". "Revolution is in the making in South Africa and
violence will be part of it". ^  A similar recent view, for example,
we find voiced in the New York Review of Books by Uhlig, who speaks
of South Africa's "....widening racial chasm..." and "As the
middle ground in South Africa has begun to fall away, the field has
thus been left increasingly to the -two mayor antagonists —  hard-line
whites on the one hand, and the growing if underground ranks of the
Z)African Rational Congress on the other". Writing from South
Africa, Lodge concludes his analysis by saying that: "The complex 
combination of social forces present in black resistance have 
succeeded in igniting a conflagration which no amount of
3)repression or incorporation will succeed in extinguishing". ’
Yet, by world standards, South Africa has not been a particularly 
unstable country. Most of the assessments of business risk made 
by international organisations, for example, place South Africa 
among the twenty more riskfree countries in the world, at least 
in the short to medium term.
1) Thomas Karis, "Revolution in the Making : Elack Politics in South 
Africa", Foreign Affairs, No 62207, Winter 1983/84, pp 378-406.
2) Mark Uhlig, "The Coming Struggle for Power",few York Review of 
Books, February 2, 1984, pp 27-31.
3) Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, Johannesburg, 
Ravan Press, 1983, p 356.
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The past few decades have been characterised by the following 
broad patterns. After the second world war up to the middle 
fifties, South Africa was a very well-controlled system with 
blacks very quiescent, although in a far worse material position 
relative to whites than today. In the late forties, however, 
radical pressures emerged in the then legal ANC. ^  Leadership 
up to then adopted a basically moderate, Christian stance 
of moral pressure. Boycott resolutions by the youth wing of 
the ANC led to the adoption of a "■programme of act-ion" in 1949, 
followed in 1951/52 by the well-known "Defiance Campaign" of the 
fifties, committed to the mobilisation of blacks through mass 
action of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations and general non­
collaboration. An alliance between the ANC, the South African 
Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation 
and the S A Congress of Democrats, many of whose members were 
former members of the Communist Party, resulted in political 
thinking among black leaders acquiring a much more radical or 
militant ideological flavour than previously.
When the more youthful Africanists in the ANC broke away in 1958 to
form the Pan African Congress an even more clearly militant and
confrontationist leadership emerged among blacks. These developments
culminated in what was South Africa's first taste of widespread overt
2 )political action from blacks. ' In the late fifties there were 
stonings of buses and beerhalls, limited marches or demonstrations 
in the major cities, but the calls for stay-at-home strikes were 
generally only partly successful. Where developments appeared 
dangerous, the authorities quelled the action with determined 
counteraction and arrests. Still the resistance mounted and 
finally it reached a peak in March and April of 1960, the time of 
the Sharpeville killings.
1) For an account of the political developments among blacks see
Gail Gerhardt, Black Power in South Africa, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978, Peter Walshe, The Rise of African 
Rationalism in South Africa, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1971, and Lodge, op. cit.
There had been serious but localised uprisings before that, such 
as the Bondelzwarts and Bulhoek rebellions. The conflicts 
earlier in the fifties were also more restricted in scope.
2)
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The PAC had prepared for massive nation-wide action, but strictly 
along the lines of passive resistance. The participation of less- 
organised youthful elements made the situation unpredictable.
While most of the Witwatersrand was quiet, there were massive 
encounters with the police in Cape Town, the Southern Witwatersrand, 
where the Sharpeville incident occurred, and in Durban. Elsewhere 
thousands burned their passes, even in Bloemfontein - a city where 
blacks had seemed to be particularly passive. A march of 15 000 
people to the centre of Cape Town, where the strikes were also 
well supported, was perhaps the most threatening to whites.
After a short period of uncertainty, the reaction of the authorities 
was decisive. An emergency was declared and over 18 000 people were 
arrested - over 25 percent of the 70 000 formal membership of the PAC 
and ANC combined.
New legislation was passed to control dissidence and the ANC and
the PAC were banned. Subsequent calls by the underground ANC for
stay-at-home strikes were largely ignored and blacks started queuing
to replace their burned passes. As Gail Gerhardt observes, "The
myth that the African masses were a volcano on the verge of an
explosion had itself been exploded". ^  Two major lessons were
learned: firstly, the mass of black people were not prepared to
risk their security and meagre privileges in any active political
engagement of the authorities , and secondly, the South African
state was easily able to control and repress the most determined
public dissidence from the radial wings of black society.
Following the emergency of 1961, there were some 200 incidents of
underground action and insurgency up to the end of 1964, but the
police steadily tracked down and destroyed the underground for-
2)mations responsible.
1) Gail Gerhardt, op. cit., p 251.
2) See Muriel Horrel, Action, Reaction and Counter-reaction, 
Johannesburg : S A Institute of Race Relations, 1971.
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A period of relative quiet followed over the rest of the sixties and 
early seventies. From 1968 onward, however, a very overt political 
consciousness began to re-emerge in the form of Black Consciousness. 
Originating in the United States (although with Africanist roots) the 
movement first gained momentum among black theology students and 
among a black student group which broke away from the dominantly 
white student organisation, NUSAS. A movement dedicated to all 
black (i.e. non-white) solidarity, by the mid-seventies had produced 
a fair number of strongly ideological organisations, including the 
South African Students Organisation (SASO) and Black Peoples 
Convention (BPC). The political culture of black solidarity and 
the spirit of independence from, and in part, hostility towards 
whites held sway over black students and high school leadership groups. 
From 1972 onwards, there were numerous demonstrations and the boycotts 
on black campuses throughout the country. These tactics established 
a new pattern of open conflict, which was soon to spread outside the 
campuses.
In 1976, black and coloured educational facilities were becoming 
increasingly over-stressed as a result of the rapid rise in pupil 
numbers. The independence of the Transkei created insecurity in 
regard to citizenship status among the very prominent Xhosa-speaking 
youth leadership on the Witwatersrand. Growth rates in the economy 
of 2 percent in 1975 and 1976 (compared with 7 percent in 1974) 
produced a spurt in black youth unemployment. The imposition of 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, despite well-backed warnings 
from parent-teachers organisations and the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, created critical anxieties among pupils under stress. 
This final frustration, against a background of youth political 
solidarity and mobilised consciousness, resulted in the June, 1976 
youth uprisings on the Witwatersrand, which spread to over 160 
communities in other parts of the Transvaal, to coloured and 
Indian pupils, to university students and even to the Inkatha- 
dominated Natal township of KwaMashu, although the scope was very 
1imited there.  ^^
1) For an account of these disturbances see Report of the Commission 
of Enquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere from June 16,
1976 to February 28, 1977 (Cillie Commission), Government Printer, 
1980, and John Kane-Berman, Soweto, Black Revot, White Reaction, 
Johannesburg : Ravan Press, 1978.
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These youth uprisings on occasion led to marches by tens of thousands 
on Johannesburg and into the centre of Cape Town, where large-scale 
confrontations with the police occurred. Several calls for sympathy 
stay-away strikes by adult workers were made. The first was partly 
successful because of coercion by the demonstrators, the second and 
particularly the third gained the co-operation of adult workers in 
Johannesburg and were 50 to 70 percent successful. Later calls for 
strikes were unsuccessful because of a tougher attitude to absenteeism 
among employers. The disturbances claimed the lives of 575 people 
(137 in Cape Town, the rest mainly on the Witwatersrand) with an 
additional 3 900 people injured. The police made nearly 6 000 
arrests over the period.
The disturbances may not have started as a deliberate political 
confrontation, but after the first clashes with the police, soon took on 
a markedly rhetorical political flavour. There was clearly organised 
leadership by students' councils and for a while their leadership was 
readily replaced after arrests. The focus of violence was generally 
state property and institutions like bottle stores which the students 
claimed weakened the political will of blacks.
Perhaps the most important consequence was that many hundreds, if 
not thousands, of young people fled the country. In June, 1978 
the Chief of the Security Police estimated that some 4 000 black 
South Africans were undergoing insurgency training abroad, and 
that he expected the number to increase steadily as a result of 
the "Soweto" uprisings.
These disturbances continued with breaks into 1979 particularly in 
the Cape. In 1980 there were once again outbreaks of boycotts 
and demonstrations among school-going youth, with hundreds of 
arrests and some violent confrontations with police. The school 
boycotts in 1980 in Natal brought the youthful demonstrators into 
conflict with Inkatha, the mass black organisation under the 
leadership of Chief Buthelezi.
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In taking stock of the situaiton, it seems that as in the early 
sixties, the black political protest from 1976 onward was no 
match for the controlling power of the state. Indeed, the police 
were able to cope relatively easily and the army did not have to 
become involved in any significant way.
It is important to consider to what extent general support from the 
mass of black adults existed during the disturbances. Hanf and 
his team from the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute found in sample 
surveys that overall, 57 percent of urban blacks declared themselves 
to be in sympathy with the Soweto disturbances. While less well- 
educated workers outside Soweto generally condemned the disturbances 
(less than 30 percent were in favour), in Soweto itself, even among 
the lower working class, 62 percent sympathised with the radical 
youth. ^  Sympathy, however, does not necessarily imply any 
likelihood of physical support. It is worth nothing, however, that 
not all the participants in the Soweto disturbances were youths.
The S A Institute of Race Relations estimated that roughly one- 
third of casualties among the demonstrators were over 26 years of
We have seen that some support from workers was forthcoming during 
the second and third calls for mass strikes. This support does 
not appear to have been very committed, however, since when the 
authorities warned the strikers by means of pamphlets, and employers 
threatened to dismiss people who were absent, the support for the 
demonstrators seemed to evaporate.
There was a quite considerable response to calls by the demonstrators 
for a boycott of white shops in Johannesburg. The Furniture Traders 
Association reported a 40 percent decline in Christmas sales in 1976, 
largely as a result of political "agitation".
1) See, Theodor Hanf et at., Sudafrika: Friedlicher Wandel?
Munchen/Mainz: Kaiser-Griinewald, 1978, p 335-336.
2) See also Kane-Berman, op cit., Chapter 1.
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This was short-lived, however, and trading soon returned to normal.
In Soweto the young peoples' organisation of a demonstration against 
rent increases in 1976 won them considerable sympathy, but the mass 
of black adults remained judiciously uninvolved.
It is clear then, that the much feared escalation of mass black 
political action did not occur, white lives and property were never 
in danger, and the loss of life, although substantial and tragic, 
never looked like becoming a bloodbath. Furthermore, serious 
divisons in black political formations were revealed once again 
since in Soweto, Cape Town and Durban, there were instances of 
violent migrant worker action against the more radical youth.
Two Government Cabinet Ministers were able to claim in late 1976 
that only 20 percent or less of Soweto had in any way shown themselves 
to be active supporters of the disturbances. ^  This, of course, 
did not take account of widespread hidden sympathies revealed by 
the attitude research quoted above, but is probably a fair reflection 
of active and committed support among adults.
At the present time, the situation once more is fairly quiescent. 
Confrontation of the police is ongoing but isolated and sporadic.
We have seen, then, that two major waves and several less prominent 
waves of active political resistance have built up since the second world 
war, none of which fundamentally threatened the security of the state. 
These waves of action have revealed a persisting failure to actively 
mobilise the majority of black adults. Is this history, which has 
been very briefly outlined, a cause for complacency among whites and 
the South African government? We turn to this issue below. 1
1) John Kane-Berman, op. cit., p 6.
8 .
2. THE CONDITIONS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
In order to assess the likelihood of instability, we have to consider 
the mix of factors which have related to revolution and rebellion in 
other societies. Much speculation exists as regards the factors 
producing revolution, but some rigorous attempts to systematise the 
causal factors have been carried out. It is clear from virtually 
all analyses that rebellion or instability is virtually never the 
result of simple deprivation, poverty or inequality.
1) 21 31The analyses considered include Brinton, Davies 1 Gurr ' and 
41Muller. ' The major propositions common to all these four authors 
and one or two major propositions which while not common to all four 
are not contradicted by any author and which are consistent with the 
other propositions have been extracted for examination in the South 
African setting.
In considering the prospects for widespread or serious political 
upheaval in South Africa in the light of these propositions, one 
is faced with the difficulty, however, that empirical evidence is 
relatively limited. Where possible survey research will be referred 
to (accepted by both Muller and Gurr as constituting valid data) but 
elsewhere it will be necessary to draw tentative conclusions on the 
basis of observation and conversations with black people and other 
South Africans. In the section which follows, the terminology 
used is not necessarily identical to that used by the authors 
referred to above. In some cases more than one specific proposition 
has been combined into a broader category. 1234
1) Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1952.
2) James C Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American 
Sociological Review, Vol 27, February 1962, pp 5-15.
3) Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton : Princeton University 
Press, 1970; and Ted Gurr and Raymond Duvall, "Civil Conflicts 
in the 1960’s", Comparative Political Studies, Vol 6, July, 1973
4) Edward N Muller, Aggressive Political Participation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979. Muller bases his theory on 
the more general behaviour theories of Martin Fishbein, "Attitude 
and the Prediction of Behaviour" in Ed M Fishbein, Readings in 
Attitude Theory and Measurement, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp 477-492.
2.1 Relative Deprivation
A crucial variable according to all four authors and many of those whom 
the four quote, including Marx and de Tocqueville is relative deprivation. 
This is defined generally as a discrepancy between what people want and 
what they have, but more precisely by Gurr as the discrepancy between what 
they consider themselves to be rightfully entitled to as opposed to what 
they believe they are able to achieve and maintain. It therefore involves 
both expectations and the prospects of rewards. Relative deprivation is 
considered below in terms of the factors which are seen to cause it.
2.1.1 Relative Deprivation due to the Stimulation of Expectations 
or Rising Expectations
Certain of the variables bearing on relative deprivation mentioned by the 
authors can be grouped together under the broad heading of the stimulation 
of expectations. Here no direct empirical survey data exists but one must 
take account of the following among blacks:
- the South African economy has experienced quite marked 
cycles of growth. The growth cycles ending in 1974/75 
and 1982 were periods of rapid absorption of blacks into 
better-paid and more varied and responsible occupations.
Black wages have grown more rapidly than those of 
whites ^  . In a broad sense these developments must 
stimulate new wants and expectations;
- furthermore the effect of the pressure of world opinion 
on the S A government is to some extent to induce a 
"legitimacy crisis", causing various government spokesmen 
from time to time to make vague but sweeping promises of 
reform and development. Here we think of the Prime 
Minister's statement at the top-level and well known
"Carlton" and "Good Hope" conferences as an example. .............. 1
1) See for example, latest trends discussed by Jill Nattrass,
"Social Change and the South African Economy", in Indicator 
SA., Durban : Centre for Applied Social Sciences, February, 1983
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These types of statements also appear to produce raised 
expectations. Empirical evidence among a sample of 
black women has pointed to a sensitivity to government 
statements  ^^ ;
- more generally, one must bear in mind that the government's 
policy of separate development is not based on a total 
negation of black political aspirations, but is an attempt to 
deflect such aspirations into the semi-autonomous and 
marginal institutions of the "homelands". Therefore, 
the forms of political participation are offered without the 
substance of access to the central decision-making process.
This in itself is likely to stimulate black political 
awareness.
2.1.1 Relative Deprivation and "Just Deserts" Frustration
In 1972, in a very detailed, semi-depth survey of black attitudes in
Durban (n 300) qualitative responses were assessed and classified in
terms of evidence of "just deserts" frustration. Among blue-collar
blacks 39 percent spontaneously provided evidence of this particular
kind of frustration, and among better-educated white-collar blacks
2)the proportion was 45 percent. In response to more specific items
on "just deserts" frustration the proportions with this attitudinal set 
rose to between 55 and 60 percent. Hence this type of relative 
deprivation appears to be widespread and has quite probably increased 
since 1972.
For example, in the research for the Buthelezi Commission in 1981 
more than 90 percent of respondents indicated that aspirations to 
equality with whites were more salient than aspirations for progress 
and improvements in incremental terms. 12
1) This effect is implicit in some of the data of the firm Markinor,
discussed in L Schlemmer et at., Black Urban Communities, Socio- 
Political Reform and the Future, Durban: Centre for Applied
Social Sciences, 1980.
2) L Schlemmer, "Political Adaptation and Reaction among Urban Africans 
in South Africa", in Social Dynamics, Vol 2 No 1, 1976, pp 3-18.
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2.1.3 Relative Deprivation : the Success of Groups with which 
Deprived people can identify
A few brief points in this regard are sufficient. Blacks would tend 
to relate themselves particularly to other "non-white" groups and to 
blacks in neighbouring territories. Nattrass's analysis ^  referred 
to earlier gives some idea of the relatively greater socio-economic 
advances being made by coloureds and particularly Indians than blacks. 
The new constitutional reforms introduced for coloureds and Indians 
but not for blacks are also very salient, and a great surge of black 
anger has marked their introduction.
Furthermore, the "liberation" achieved by successive neighbour 
communities in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and, perhaps in the not 
too distant future, Namibia, would suggest that rising political 
aspirations are quite dramatic in the South African situation.
In fact the Buthelezi Commission research established that 80 percent 
or more of blacks sampled had a strong, affective identification with 
events in Zimbabwe. Whether these effects will increase, be main­
tained or decrease over time is difficult to say.
2.2 The Salience of Deprivation : low levels of Satisfaction in regard 
to Benefits which people consider to be crucial
All the authors referred to make the point that absolute deprivation and 
oppression as such do not stimulate revolutionary consciousness (people 
tend to become obsessed with day-to-day survival under such conditions). 
They do however, argue that where deprivation is "relative", one must 
also consider the salience of the benefits which people consider themselves 
deprived of. 1
1) Jill Nattrass, op. cit.
1 2 .
The Buthelezi Commission research probed desires for reform and 
perceived needs for reform in some detail. ' Education emerged 
consistently as one of the top three most highly valued benefits 
and also as one of the services most basic to other achievements.
The demand for improvement in education was also up among the three 
most salient requirements.
Objectively, however, education is one of the most problematic of 
issues among the spectrum of reforms. Firstly, the ratio of per- 
capita expenditure on black versus white education is so wide 
(- 1:7) that decades will pass before fiscal equality is reached. 
Secondly, black education suffers from a vicious circle of deficiencies 
which mean that improvements in quality will be as slow or slower than 
funding improvements. Prospects in this area are negative, despite 
attempts by the government to improve the situation.
2.3 Deprivation : the Scope of Sharing of Perceived Deficiencies
Gurr and others argue that the spread and scope of relative deprivation 
will influence the degree to which revolutionary consciousness is 
stimulated.
In a study in 1979 of "Quality of Life" among whites, Indians, and 
blacks in Durban, it was found that the scope of perceived deprivation 
among blacks compared to other groups is dramatically more widespread 
than the objective differences in material circumstances would suggest.
A certain threshold of perceived deprivation on salient issues was 
taken as standard for the three groups. Blacks experienced 
deprivation in 22 life-concerns above this threshold, compared with 
9 among Indians and 3 among whites. 1
1) The Buthelezi Commission : The Requirements for Stability and
Development in KwaZulu and Ratal, a commission of enquiry into the 
political future of KwaZulu and Natal, KwaZulu Government, March 
1982 (published by H and H Publications, Durban 1982). (See Vol 1.) 
An overall sample of 2 630 blacks formed the basis of this report.
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The form of the questioning reduced the effects of a "complaining 
ethic” and hence the results were very telling.1  ^ Needless to say, 
the spread of frustrations among blacks indicates a considerable 
degree of shared consciousness on this issue.
2.4 Deprivation : Policy Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation
The author Muller in particular makes special mention of the role of 
political consciousness and political alienation as factors which can 
stand apart from a sense of deprivation.
In this regard evidence is available from the large scale attitude
2)research undertaken by the Buthelezi Commission. The level of
expressed "anger and impatience" or "Dissatisfaction" with "life
in South Africa" among blacks is clearly very high, and has been
increased rapidly over the five years from 1977 to 1981. (The
findings in the Buthelezi Commission research are compared with
strictly comparable results for 1977 obtained by Hanf et al. , of
3)the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. The results below 
are for the most extreme expression of dissatisfaction - "anger 
and impatience". 123
1) Valerie Miller and Lawrence Schlemmer, "Quality of Life in South 
Africa", Social Indicators Research, Vol 12, 1983, pp 225-279.
2) The Buthelezi Commission, op. cit.
3) Theodor Hanf et al., op. cit. Similar samples and the same 
field work team were used.
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"Anger and Impatienae" with "Life in South Africa Today" 
(based on responses to a 5 point verbal cum pictorial scale)
Witwatersrand 1977 39%
All black males 1981 56%
Witwatersrand and KwaZulu 1977 39%
Zulu men 1981 53%
Better educated 1977 45%
Witwatersrand and KwaZulu
Men 1981 68%
These results tend to speak for themselves. In an earlier study, 
also nation-wide, it appeared that levels of dissatisfaction with 
specifically political and legal conditions and circumstances were 
relatively higher among all groups than dissatisfaction with a 
range of non-political aspects of life, excluding the specific 
issue of incomes. ^' In the results of the research for the 
Buthelezi Commission it was clear that the dissatisfaction was 
widespread across social classes and urban and rural regions.
A rough index of political alienation can be obtained from the 
extent of support for availablepolitical institutions. In a 
pre-independence referendum held among blacks of Ciskeian 
affiliation, roughly one-third of the total number of people 
who theoretically could have participated did so. In Soweto, 
the percentage polls in elections for the Urban Councils have 
dropped from 32 percent in 1968 to 14 percent in 1978, and 
the participation in elections held this year was no higher.
The only regions where formal political participation is 
reasonably high are either strictly within the homelands 
(although the latest elections in Bophuthatswana had a low 
poll) or in Natal-KwaZulu, where the political formation of 
Inkatha, under Chief Buthelezi , has created fairly considerable 
political legitimacy. 1
1) L. Schlemmer, Research Appendix to the report of the Commission 
of Enquiry into the Ciskei, The Quail Report, February 1980, 
Pretoria, Conference Associates, 1980.
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In another exploration of political alienation, a full range of 
newspapers for the past year has been perused in order to 
identify statements from black spokesmen that would indicate 
political alienation from or loyalty and identification with the 
system. An insignificant number of quotations or reports came 
to hand which indicated positive support for the system, no 
matter how subtly. All statements indicated either highly 
particularistic commitments, protest, or a complete negation 
of the system. Generally, this aspect of deprivation must be 
counted as indicative of potential instability. ^
2.5 Utilitarian Justification for Aggressive Political Participation
All the authors make the point that deprivation, frustration and 
political alienation will not stimulate a revolutionary consciousness 
unless accompanied by social norms among dissident groups which will 
support the goal of confrontation with the system. These norms must 
amount to accepted "justifications" of confrontation.
This aspect, however, has not been adequately covered in the research 
results to hand. Nevertheless, the demonstration-effects of the 
results of insurgency in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique must have 
created the widespread impression that confrontation and violence has 
utility, that it can work. Furthermore, the fact that the government 
has not been able to disguise the fact that it has re-oriented some of 
its policies for black urban areas since the 1976-77 Township 
disturbances is relevant. There are thus, some very broad indications 
that utilitarian justifications for political aggression may exist.
1) The scan of statements was made on the basis of the press clipping 
service of the Journal Indicator SA, and covers a full range of 
both establishment and "alternative" publications.
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2.6 Moral Justifications for Political Aggression
Here we will simply take the results of attitude surveys conducted 
for the Buthelezi Commission as indicative of a climate of normative 
views. A general indication of the extent of militancy of sentiment 
in the black population appears from the following series of results:
A statement presented to respondents read as follows:
"It is best for black South Africans to be careful in 
Politics and not get Into trouble" (n 2 600)
KwaZulu/Natal cities:
Agree 49%
Disagree 51%
Witwatersrand:
Agree 45%
Disagree 54%
Another item was as follows:
"If the Government does not 'introduce changes for blacks in the 
next 10 years, which of the following do you expect?" (n 2 600+)
"Definitely Expect"
Blacks will be too 
frightened by army/
Rural 
KwaZulu
KwaZulu 
Natal Cities Witwatersrand
police to act
Many more blacks will 
leave country for
21% 9% 17%
military training 44% 56% 51%
Mass strikes by black
workers 60% 65% 64%
Bloodshed/war/revolution 
(spontaneous addition)
80+% 80+% 80+%
(note: the remarkable figure of 80+ percent in reference to bloodshed
above must be seen in a context of the build-up of suggestion in the 
previous items.)
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Items which are somewhat closer to attitudinal indices of possible 
behaviour, and not merely sentiment, are reflected in the following 
series.
Paraphrased versions of items used are as follows:^
"Would black workers strike for two weeks In response to a call 
by a well respected black leader?" (N 300)
All KwaZulu/Natal
Almost all 20%
Many 49%
Only a few 29%
"If the ANC (insurgents) were to come in secvetly asking people 
to help it and work with it___.what would happen?" (n 300)
All Natal/KwaZulu
Most would try to help 19%
Many would help it 29%
A few 29%
Nobody/almost nobody 
would help it 8%
"Most or many would help the ANC" (first and second categories above)
(n 300)
All Natal/KwaZulu 48%
Rural 46%
Youth: 18-24 years 56%
White collar workers 56%
Ski 1led/semi-skil led
workers 55%
These results speak for themselves. There is an abundance of 
attitudinal sentiment supportive of confrontation and political 
aggression. Quite clearly also, the "system" has very little 
legitimacy at the present time and there is a clear orientation 
to an alternative order. The normative justifications for confrontation 
exist in full measure.
1) From research for the Buthelezi Commission, op. cit.
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2.7 Availability for Aggressive Political Participation
The author Muller makes the point that no matter what the grievances or 
justifications might be, political aggression will not take place unless 
there are sufficient numbers of people whose circumstances allow them to 
act outside of the framework of convention.
The pattern of unrest in 1976 and subsequently has shown that there is 
a great number of young adults "available", by virtue of urban youth 
unemployment and not infrequent school boycotts for public demonstrations 
or more serious encounters. With the current downturn in the economy, 
the relative numbers have increased sharply over the past two years.
Counter-indications are available for the settled labour force, 
however. Although South Africa's incidence of labour-time lost 
through strikes has increased rapidly in recent years, ^  the short 
duration and the specifically production and wage-oriented nature 
of strikes makes it seem that working adults are not "available" at 
this stage for prolonged withdrawal from gainful employment for 
political action. This issue will be discussed in more detail 
presently.
It needs simply to be noted, however, that in a rapidly-growing 
population, the proportion of more readily "available" black youth 
in the black population overall is relatively very high.
2.8 Relative Size of the Dissident Group
The authors referred to are generally in agreement that the relative 
size of the group supporting the dissident cause is an important factor 
in the mix of factors predisposing to unrest. Needless to say this is 
a prominent consideration in South Africa in which the controlling minority 
of whites constitute a minority of one-fifth of the total population.
1) Reports of the National Manpower Commission, Government Printer, 
1982, 1982.
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Yet in South Africa the huge preponderance of potential dissidents 
may in fact have the effect of increasing the determination with 
which whites defend their cause, as will be discussed presently.
2.9 Summary to this point
So far every indicator chosen has broadly suggested a very great 
potential for political aggression or violence. The criteria of 
Muller, Gurr and other authors not yet discussed, however, all 
refer to structural and environmental factors which can potentially 
inhibit the manifestation of such aggression. These factors will be 
assessed as a group in a general discussion, since the political 
environment in South Africa contains a number of overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing features which make it difficult to treat the 
authors' variables singly.
3. INHIBITIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENT
A number of points which cluster round this theme will be made.
The black organisations likely to espouse and actively mobilise for 
potential aggression have all been banned and are now located 
externally. The opportunities for mass-mobilisation in South 
Africa are limited. In the current situation most of the 
insurgency which does occur is externally planned and organised.
In 1979, according to S A Broadcasting Corporation reports, 
there were 12 cases of violent insurgency. By 1981 there were 
55, but in 1982 the number appeared to have dropped to roughly 
30 instances, ^  although full records are still not available. This
is what Gurr would refer to as "conspiracy" --- mobilisation by
small elite groups without mass participation.
The correlations with education in the survey data quoted above 
all suggest, in Gurr's terms, a relatively greater discontent 
among the black "elites", and therefore a pre-condition for 
conspiracy exists.
1) See Peter Randal (Ed) Survey of Race Relations in South Africa,
Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1983, p 230.
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However, here again a strong inhibitor exists at the present time. 
Police claims in the media are that over 90 percent of under­
ground insurgents who have participated in some act of sabotage 
are tracked down.
Generally, then, the degree of regime surveillance, control and 
action against radical organisations as well as the high level of 
motivation in the regime security service (its white leadership 
and substantial white personnel ensure loyalty) is sufficient to 
discourage any organised internal attempts to confront the system.
It seems that a build-up of youth dissidence and dissident leader­
ship can occur, but here again, the regime organisations can contain 
and ultimately inhibit it. This important issue will be discussed 
further below. One must consider, however, the prospects of 
unorganised action of a kind difficult to control.
3.1 Political Worker Action
One looks, then, at the prospects of what Gurr called "turmoil" 
or disorganised, leaderless violence. A particular focus of 
interest here is that of the potential for politically oriented 
labour disturbances.
The comments already made above on labour disturbances do not 
suggest a strong tendency to violent confrontation among black 
workers, who would be required to support the youth dissidents 
if turmoil were to take on threatening proportions. Some people 
consider that the high levels of labour unrest show a tendency in this 
direction. The earlier comments on labour unrest patterns would 
counter-indicate this, but further discussion is necessary.
In 1981, the number of man-days lost in strikes was roughly 190
per 1 000 black employees. ^  Comparing this with other countries
for 1979, shows that the bHack strike incidence in South Africa
is well below the incidence in the U K, U S A, Australia, Canada,
Italy, Isreal and other ocuntries in which the economy is highly 
2)strike prone. '_______________________________________________________
1) Report of the National Manpower Commission, op. cit.
2) See 1980 Yearbook on Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organisation, Geneva.
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The pattern for the first six months of 1982, as given by the 
Minister of Manpower in parliament, shows a slight increase 
in numbers in 1982 but a decrease in the time taken to resolve 
strikes.
The pattern of black strike activity over the past years appears 
worth noting. After years of very low activity there was a 
sharp increase in 1973 and 1974, in response to inflation, 
declining real income and poor communication in industry. The 
ensuing years from 1975 to 1979 once again represented a period 
of very low labour unrest. In 1980, after the new labour 
legislation had led to a spurt in union activity and worker 
mobilisation, strike action increased once again quite sharply 
until 1982. It was then probably slightly above the average 
levels for 1973 and 1974. The general impression for 1983 is 
that it declined again in response to the economic recession 
(standardised figures for 1983 are not yet available).
One must conclude that strike activity tends to be cyclical in 
response to organisational, legislative and economic factors.
There does not seem to be any burgeoning of labour instability 
as a consequence of political factors of a direct kind. The 
official classification of causes of strike activity bear this 
out - political causes are not mentioned at all.
There are a few considerations in regard to the effect of politics
on labour instability which deserve mention, however. An analysis
of regional patterns of labour unrest shows that the Eastern Cape
is dramatically over-represented as regards labour unrest relative
2)to employment numbers.
1) See Randall, op. cit., p 184.
2) National Manpower Commission, op. cit.,p 224.
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There is no logical reason for this other than the well-known 
fact that blacks in the Eastern Cape tend to exhibit a higher 
degree of political militancy than elsewhere. It would seem 
that political consciousness interacts with other factors in 
labour relations (grievances, wage rates, etc.) - possibly as 
a catalyst - in determining the level of strike-proneness, 
without the strikers necessarily taking an overt political 
objectives.
Secondly, the wave of strikes about pensions in late 1982, 
reflected among other factors a lack of trust in government 
and its intentions as regards the handling of workers' pension 
contributions and benefits. ^  Here, one may argue, is a case 
of the low political legitimacy of the key institutions in the 
system inducing a heightened instability among members of the 
black labour force.
We appear to have evidence, then, of a political factor in labour 
unrest. However, this does not represent political unrest in 
the black labour force as such. There is still little or no 
activity on the labour front which Gurr would regard as signs 
of incipient turmoil.
Black attitudes to trade unionism seem to support the conclusion 
above. When asked what trade unions could do for blacks, fewer 
than 5 percent of respondents in a study in Natal/KwaZulu 
mentioned a political function of goal (n 300, 1981). '
More recently, a group of 65 highly unionised black industrial 
employees with a history of strike activity were asked in the 
course of intensive depth interviews how blacks could gain redress 
for political grievances.
1) L Schlemmer, P Geerdts and L van Schalkwyk, The Tensions Strikes: 
a Research Analysis of Causes, Indicator SA, Durban, Vol 1 No 3, 
1983 (Industrial Monitor) p 6.
2) Buthelezi Commission, op. cit., p 6.
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Fewer than 20 percent saw labour power as a political weapon or expected 
trade unions to pursue political goals outside the workplace.^ During 
the introduction of the new constitution for whites, coloureds and 
Indians recently, certain black trade union movements sought to mobilise 
black workers in protest. Only on major work stoppage occurred in one 
company and that was of very brief duration.
Labour is not seen in a political light. Blacks are relatively highly 
politicised and have quite well-developed militant sentiments, but there 
is still a very clear tendency for the political and labour spheres to 
be separated in the collective thinking of the black labour force.
One can argue that this separation of spheres may not continue.
Apart from the examples of interaction between political and labour 
action given above, there are also examples of boycotts of products 
in solidarity with aggrieved workers. The well-known Fattis and 
Monis boycott and meat boycotts of a few years ago were cases in point.
These consumer-boycotts refelected a new development of some import 
which deserves further anlaysis, but they cannot be classified as 
the kind of political action which Gurr is referring to, and therefore 
do not seem to add up to a "-political destabilisation" of the labour 
force.
There is thus very little direct indication of a growth of directly 
politically inspired activism in the mass of black labour. This, 
as we see, is in large measure due to the separation of employment and 
political issues. If ever the separation of spheres were to be bridged, 
it would introduce political activism right into a domain where blacks 
have real bargaining power, with quite dramatic consequences.
1) Study in the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, publication 
forthcoming.
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3.2 Coercion and Fear
In part the caution exhibited by blacks which is clear from the preceding 
section is a few reaction. The security apparatus in South Africa and 
its activities have a powerful "demonstration" effect on people. It is 
well-known inside and outside South Africa that thousands of people over 
the years have been detained without trial in terms of security legislation. 
Furthermore, the occurrence of deaths in detention are well-publicised 
and quite understandably create a climate of fear among could-be political 
activists.
The pattern of security action over the years is difficult to monitor 
since information is often inconsistent or unsystematic. Generally­
speaking, however, it seems that there was a decrease in political 
detentions between 1980 and 1982 but that the figures for 1983 show a 
current increase in the numbers of people affected by security action.
If one takes political detentions, with or without trials, as one index 
the following pattern emerges, based on statistics kept by the South 
African Institute of Race Relations and the South African Council of 
Churches. ^
(* Figures given by the Minister of Police were higher.)
There is little doubt, however, that the current action by the security 
forces is at a lower level than it was in the 1970's. This is also 
reflected in the much lower current levels of political bannings and 
house-arrests.
1) See Annual Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1980, 1981, 1982, 
Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, and a press 
statement on 8 March 1984. Figures include the independent homelands.
1980 (up to November)
1981 (up to November)
1982 (up to November)
1983
956 people 
630 people
264-310* people 
453 people
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By the standards of totalitarian regimes, the figures for 
political detentions are not high in the population of 25 million 
people. Possibly, however, the fear of detention and its 
consequences and the image of efficiency which the South African 
regime probably enjoys (relative to the regimes of less-developed 
totalitarian societies) may have the effect of inducing great 
caution. Nevertheless, the level of security control is not 
such as to suggest that it is the only factor constraining the 
black population of South Africa.
3.3 Dual Consciousness among Blacks
There is, in addition to the fear-coercion factor, considerable 
evidence of certain kinds of political ambivalence among the 
black people of South Africa.
The research for the Buthelezi Commission and the Quail Commission, 
referred to earlier, has shown that, despite the high levels of 
militancy, discontent and frustration evidenced in the findings, 
the minimum political demands, in policy-terms, of a wide cross- 
section of blacks are surprisingly moderate. Broadly, one can 
say that 60 to 70 percent of blacks declare themselves prepared 
to accept socio-political arrangements which amount to substantial 
compromises with white interests. In particular, majorities of 
blacks are willing to accept "oonsociational" arrangements in 
which whites would have equal power with blacks in a future 
dispensation.
More pertinent to this topic, however, are the following results 
of a separate study among 150 black adults in Durban in 1979, 
which in part was devoted to an explanation of more "rational" 
considerations of strategy. The following examples are relevant:
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Percentage endorsement of alternative-choice statements 
relating to black political strategy (Zulu men, n 150. Sample 
had higher than average education, hence was fairly highly 
politicised. Statements are paraphrased, uncertain responses 
omitted.)
"A leader must act strongly to win support 22%
vs
He should wait in order to form a strong
organisation." 76%
"A black leader should never co-operate with
the government 11 %
vs
He should criticise, but co-operate where beneficial." 85%
"Being patient does not help, a leader must make
strong demands now 30%
vs
He must be patient and work with the tools he has." 61%
"There is no longer anything to be gained by being
patient 19%
vs
It still pays to be patient and plan carefully 81%
"Some people say that overseas companies should stop buying 
South African goods and stop sending money to build factories 
so as to frighten the South African government into getting 
rid of apartheid. Others say they should continue because 
it makes gobs for all people in South Africa. "
° Stop (boycott/disinvestment) 20%
° Continue trading/investing 75%
° Dont know 5%
2 7 .
Even among the most militant-group of "black consciousness" and ANC 
supporters, no more than 33 percent of respondents advocated the dis­
investment strategy.
If we add to these results the fact that the Buthelezi Commission 
findings showed that 70 percent or more blacks not only would 
oppose discrimination against whites, but also indicated that they 
valued white participation in South African society, ^  then 
a complex picture emerges, along broadly the following lines.
Blacks are highly discontented, with an attitudinal potential
for political aggression. At the same time, however, it is
clear that certain advantages are recognised in living within the system.
Clearly, the capacity of the South African economy to generate employment
and to create expanding material prospects is one important factor
2 )
emerging from these results.
Furthermore, the attitudinal results seem to indicate that the 
"system" may not be perceived as totally inflexible. There appears 
to be a feeling that patience, negotiation and the building-up of 
bargaining power will lead to reforms and concessions granted 
peacefully.
The responses of whites in the system are also sufficiently 
varied to prevent a rigid stereotyping of the "enemy". There 
is also (from results not quoted) a clear indication among blacks 
of an appreciation of the value of white technological expertise.
What is perhaps most important among these factors, is that 
despite the government's present determination not to yield to 
pressures for black constitutional reform, a perception seems to 
exist among blacks that not all non-violent options are closed.
This attitude is very closely related to one of the conditions which 
Gurr mentions as counter-acting the effects of relative deprivation - 
the perception of opportunities for incremental gains.
1) The Buthelezi Commission, Vol 1 op. cit.
2) The figures of Jill Nattrass given earlier on the increasing share 
of income enjoyed blacks are relevant here.
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Therefore, there appears to be a dual-consciousness among blacks 
of a kind which counteracts the attitudes of discontent and 
concepts of violent political strategy which so many observers 
of South African society would expect. In other words, 
substantial proportions of black rank-and-file people seem to 
feel able to maintain a practical approach to political behaviour.
3.4 The Resources and Performance of the System of Control
Turning to certain of Gurr's and the other authors' structural 
criteria, we may note that there is also no loyalty to the 
dissident cause among regime forces. Whites, while a minority, 
have absolute population numbers and skills sufficient to control 
an efficient military-security system. Furthermore, security and 
surveillance controls are very consistent and have demonstrated 
their severity, particularly in past years. Virtually no internal 
dissident organisation capable of operating sufficiently openly to 
sanction, reward or encourage violence exists or is able to exist 
for very long. Here we have to take account of a particularly 
complex and multi-facetted set of controls over political 
communication and over the activities of organisations and their 
funding. Inkatha ^  has the organisational strength, perhaps, 
to countervail these controls but does not support violence. If 
it were to support violence there would probably be mass defection 
from its ranks.
Muller speaks of the effectiveness, quality and flexibility of 
administration as a factor discouraging the build-up of political 
aggression. This factor can be broadened, and seen as a 
generalised responsiveness (apparent or real) in the system. In 
South Africa this has various components.
1) Inkatha now has membership of some 750 000 and is therefore the 
largest black political organisation.
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Firstly, we have noted the capacity of the economy to generate 
incremental rewards, and to respond to pressures of various kinds 
for an improvement in levels of material welfare. Not only are 
Nattrass's figures relevant again, but various (very recent) 
government attempts to improve housing provision and educational 
services for blacks are also relevant, as are steady, albeit 
cautious, moves towards the desegregation of more and more 
facilities.
Secondly, in part as a consequence of the policy of separate 
development and the decentralisation of functions to marginal 
(black) authorities, a very large number of better-educated 
black people are absorbed into senior bureaucratic and 
administrative positions in the state system. Even in the 
police force, there are over 75 black commissioned officers.
If one adds all these positions together, it would amount to 
the effective co-optation of thousands of better-educated blacks.
If one adds to these the numbers of black incumbents at similar 
levels in the private sector, it is clear that there is a 
considerable drain of talent away from the revolutionary cause, 
as it were.
One can make this point notwithstanding the fact that there is 
still massive inequality in the relative occupational advancement 
of blacks and whites. All that is suggested here is that the 
system is seen to generate occupational opportunity.
Another factor in this regard is the fact that the administration 
of black affairs is becoming more and more sophisticated. Particularly 
since the 1975 disturbances, administrators of higher quality have 
been put in charge of the larger black urban communities. Currently, 
although there is legislation pending which may make Influx Control 
to the cities and in the cities more rigid, there has also been new 
legislation to create a much more legitimate system of black local 
government.^ It is not claimed here that all the myriad 
frustrations and restricitons for black people in South Africa are 
being removed.
1) Black Local Authorities Act No 102 of 1982.
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What is happening is simply that changes and shifts do occur, 
and while they are inadequate in objective, quantitative terms, 
they create the impression of flexibility or impending change 
in the system.
Finally in this regard, South Africa has one characteristic which
most authoritarian regimes do not have --- a fairly intense debate
about social change in the mass media. This probably has a double 
effect in raising hopes and expectations but at the same time 
creating a running impression of the potential for change and 
reform in the system. Whatever the real flexibility of the 
system may or may not be, the mass media and public debates 
certainly create an impression of possibilities.
This real or apparent system responsiveness, coupled with effective 
security controls and an emasculation of counter-system organisation 
is likely to continue to protect the established regime functions, 
at least in the short term.
3.5 Resource Mobilisation among Blacks - the Quality of Dissident 
Organisation
Basic to dissident organisation is the role of intellectuals who 
turn away from the regime system to assist the dissident cause.
In South Africa, particularly in the Congress Movement in the 
late fifties and in the development of the re-emergent black 
trade union movement in the seventies, intellectuals of all 
races have played a very prominent role. Today, with the 
exception of the trade union movement, in which the role of 
intellectuals is impressive, their response in dissident organ­
isations is ineffective for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, white opposition politics in South Africa has a fairly dynamic 
quality and this activity provides outlets for intellectual skills 
and commitments. Now that coloureds and Indians are to be absorbed 
into the parliamentary system, a small but increasing proportion of 
intellectuals from these communities will be drawn into formal
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political activity. The homeland government system has absorbed 
a number of intellectuals into formal political activity as well. 
The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha, for example, includes 
a few PhD's, several lawyers and medical doctors and a very large 
number of graduates.
Secondly, culture plays a role in weakening the effectiveness of 
intellectuals. The radical white, Indian and coloured and some 
black intellectuals who are available to support dissident 
organisation are products of a system of academic socialisation 
which is virtually identical to that in the U S A ,  Britain and 
Holland. They are or have pretentions to being cosmopolitan 
sophisticates. The rank-and-file black organisations, on the 
other hand, have a different political culture. Firstly they 
would prefer to use indigenous languages, sing mobilising songs, 
enjoy symbolic rituals and geneally celebrate pride in an African 
identity. Generally, with the exception of the trade union 
movement which is of obvious utility to rank-and-file black people, 
the intellectual role in South Africa penetrates no more than the 
disaffected black bourgeousie, who themselves are very western 
and urban in their political culture.
Thirdly, radical intellectuals in South Africa, once again with 
the exception of those involved in the trade union movement, 
display great moral and existential dilemmas which undermine 
their effectiveness. Many of them seek the approval of or want 
recognition from the anti-South African exile movements abroad, 
which include many powerful figures of great significance to the 
dissident cause in South Africa. The movements abroad, because 
of their removal from the local situation, have to pursue one of 
two possible strategies —  either a "boycott" strategy or the 
strategy of armed confrontation. These strategies of the exile 
movements have been raised to the level of what amounts virtually 
to a moral dogma of liberation.
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From a radical perspective, these strategies make sense overseas 
but have to be carefully questioned inside South Africa. Yet one 
finds a very substantial proportion of radicals of all races in 
South Africa who accept the popular wisdom of the exile movements 
and refuse to participate in any way in the structures of the 
system. They seek to maintain the greatest possible moral 
distance from the tainted institutions of separation and apartheid.
They therefore lose opportunities to mobilise within approved 
black political structures like local councils, regional homeland 
governments, referenda, etc. etc. This viewpoint has contributed 
substantially to robbing these government-provided structures of 
political legitmacy in the outside world and among the black petty 
bourgeoisie but has also prevented such structures from achieving 
viability as vehicles through which to oppose government policy.
The radical intellectuals would argue that they have achieved notable 
success through robbing the separate political institutions of 
legitimacy. On the other hand, however, the structures persist and 
function to absorb quite a great deal of the energies of many 
talented blacks who do participate. The political risks attendant 
upon alternative avenues of grass-roots political mobilisation are 
so great that very little develops.
Generally speaking then, this author's argument is that radical political 
organisation has failed and will probably continue to fail to involve 
the black rank-and-file in large numbers. The latest organisation 
dedicated to this cause, the United Democratic Front, appears to be 
enjoying great success among students, academics, coloured and 
Indian schoolteachers and middle-class voluntary organisations but 
has so far not demonstrated any success in capturing the imagination 
of the black rank-and-file except in particular areas for short 
periods around specific issues like rents.^
1) See "Durban Blacks : Local Government in Crisis", in Indicator 
SA, Vol 1, No 3, (Political Monitor) p 6.
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Added to this fact, the government has over the past four years 
quite dramatically altered its policies with regard to the black 
petty bouregoisie. In the fifties, sixties and most of the 
seventies, the government pursued a policy ofrestricting black 
trading, black free-enterprise and black professional activity in 
the so-called "white” cities. Today it has corporations 
(like the Small Business Development Corporation) to promote 
black business, professionals are allowed premises in central 
city areas and the salaries of fully-qualified black professionals 
in the civil service have been made equal to those of whites. 
There is thus less and less likelihood that the black petty 
bourgeoisie will side with the black proleteriat as they increas­
ingly did in the fifties, sixties and seventies.
4. CONCLUSION : THE PROSPECTS FOR UNREST
One has to conclude that in terms of both Gurr's, Muller's and the 
other authors' attitudinal, normative and availability factors, 
virtually all the precoditions for an escalation of political 
violence appear to exist in South Africa. The implications of 
the results on various indexes given in this paper are obvious and 
need not be summarised here.
On the other hand, the structural and organisational criteria 
for revolution or for "turmoil", "civil war" or effective 
"conspiracy" among political leader figures inside South Africa 
are not met. The mobilisation of counter-regime resources is 
clearly no match for the resources which the government can and 
does mobilise.
In the past two-and-half decades two successive waves of political 
violence have failed to fully extend the forces of law and order, 
let alone threaten the survival of the regime. While there have 
been responses to the violence in the form of policy adaptations 
and reform, the efforts have been sluggish or unhurried and the 
effects undramatic. The "Soweto" disturbances have yielded
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certain improvements in conditions for blacks in urban areas (the 
99 year leasehold system, giving security of housing tenure; an 
increase in the rate of building of classrooms) but these effects 
fall far short of what could be called structural change. Hence, 
a collective and widespread belief that violence will have practical 
benefits simply has not developed.
Does this conclusion mean that South Africa will be a peaceful 
society in the longer-term as the 20th Century draws to an end?
Not at all. It will probably be a relatively stable order, but 
the stability of its production and administrative systems is 
likely to co-exist with a level of contained violence emanating 
from expatriate organisations like the ANC and perhaps others.
The reasons for this contradiction lie in the fact that South Africa
is as .yet far from being a fully-developed society, and large numbers
of black people will not be included in the economic system and in
the network of services and facilities. Here one thinks particularly
of the unemployed youth, whose educational level is rapidly increasing,
along with their expectations and aspirations.^ Furthermore, among
youthful migrant workers who are unemployed, the rapidly increasing
density of settlement in the black rural areas means that more and
more are deprived of the alternative security of subsistence
2 )agriculture on small allotments in traditional areas. '
It is from these categories of people that one may expect a steady 
stream of economic, if not political, "refugees" to leave South Africa 
to receive insurgency training abroad. The current and likely future 
ability of South African forces to destroy insurgent bases in 
neighbourhood territories as well as the very recent security 
agreements with Mozambique and Swaziland will probably severely 
curtail the ease of return of the trained insurgents. However 
the current pattern of regular but limited sabotage will continue. 
Furthermore, as the technology of insurgency and the levels of 
training improve, the sabotage is likely to become more serious in 
its effects. We must bear in mind, however, that many societies 
have demonstrated a capacity to accommodate fairly high levels of
1) Sixty percent of black unemployment is among people under 30 yhears
of age: The current Population Survey of Department of Statistics, 1982.
2) See The Buthelezi Commission, op. ait., p 235 for details of rural 
resources of samples of blacks in KwaZulu.
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sabotage for long periods. Sabotage in itself does not topple 
governments.
The effects of sustained or moderately increased sabotage will be 
complex. On the one hand, sabotage probably has a politicising 
and morale-boasting effect on substantial proportions of the more 
disaffected blacks. Given the system of control and the dual 
consciousness of the mass of economically active blacks, however, 
it is unlikely to encourage open action. It may even be perceived 
as an excuse for non-involvement in political activity inside South 
Africa. People may feel that their cause is being taken care of 
by the insurgents. The effects on whites, provided it does not 
reduce confidence in the economy, which it has not done up to now, 
will probably be to increase solidarity and to rally support for 
the government.
These speculations pre-suppose that insurgency will be contained 
below a certain threshold of effect on the economy and costs of 
containment. In a very real sense, the future of South Africa is 
dependent on the contest between insurgency action and the capacity 
of the state to contain it below a critical threshold. The nature 
of the overall political system as it has been analysed in this 
paper would suggest that, apart from counter-insurgency techniques 
and strategies, solutions to the problem of black youth unemployment 
and relations with surrounding states are the most critical factors. 
The government is certainly aware of this and new schemes for the 
training of unemployed blacks have recently been launched. The 
task is daunting, however, since the economy has developed a 
tendency to capital intensity. The government is certainly moving 
quite dramatically to reduce the risk of insurgency bases in 
neighbouring states.
One uncertainty relates to the possibility of a politicisation of 
labour action (or related consumer action). The scenario above has 
been sketched on the assumption that blacks will continue to separate 
the political from the labour and consumer spheres. If not, investor
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confidence will be affected, and this confidence is the key to 
South Africa's stability. A breakdown in business confidence will 
produce a vicious cycle of declining capacity to cope with problems, 
increased recruitment for insurgency (through increased youth 
unemployment), lessened capacity to deal with it, leading to even 
lower business confidence, and so on. There is, at this stage, 
however, no indication of such a process occurring.
Given the constellation of factors outlined in this paper, and 
provided the assumptions and observations in the analysis are 
valid, the most probable future for the current regime in South 
Africa is likely to be one of cycles of black youth unrest and a 
moderately increasing level of insurgency and sabotage. The 
former will be contained, as before. The latter factor, the level 
and costs of insurgency, defies prediction, but one thing is
fairly certain --- it will not topple the regime. It could however
drag the whole system down to a lower level of economic welfare in 
which reforms will be reversed and the state will return to its old 
role of authoritarian repression and control.
It
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